of my answer appears to be original. It is because the two parts of my answer taken as a whole are fundamental to assessing the importance of the developing theory of stockholder unanimity that I derive both parts here explicitly. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model that is used throughout. It is a standard, frictionless, two-period, one good model of an economy with firms and consumers. The one added feature that it contains is a distinction between the observable component of the state of nature and the unobservable component of the state of nature. The next three sections contain the formal analysis of the model. In Section 3 I introduce the idea of spanning the observable component of the state space. In Section 4 I show that an incentive exists for entrepreneurs to introduce new securities into the economy as long as the observable component is not spanned. That such an incentive exists implies that the economy is not in full, long run equilibrium whenever the observable component is not spanned.
In Section 5 I derive, based in particular on Leland's [1978] work, two conditions that assure stockholder unanimity whenever, as is likely according to Section 4's result, the state space's observable component is spanned. In Section 6 I interpret these conditions on the assumption that the observable component is in fact spanned and arrive at the following conclusion. Stockholders are likely to be unanimous towards a proposed investment project if the returns it yields are only a function of the state space's observable component and risks that are objectively assessable. If, however, the proposed project's returns depend on the unobservable component with probabilities that are primarily subjective, then stockholder unanimity is no longer assured. Such an eventuality is possible because a proposed investment project may, in effect, be a proposal for that firm to conduct an experiment that will make observable an aspect of the state of nature that was formerly unobservable under that and all other firms' original production plans. For example, if initially no firm has a plan to implement a new and very different production technology, then the economic feasibility (or infeasibility) of that technology is an unobservable aspect of the state of nature because no firm intends to do the experiment of trying that technology out and actually observing its economic feasibility. Moreover, if the technology is different enough, then no objective assessment of the risks involved may be possible, i.e., equally qualified engineers may disagree vehemently on the probability of success. Thus it is for the truly innovative investment projects that stockholder unanimity probably breaks down, not for the routine investment projects that firms most commonly consider. Section 7 concludes the paper by posing some related questions that are beyond the scope of this paper. (Continued) and, second, he states (p. 78):
...we are neglecting the consideration that the creation of markets in new assets will be costly. Congressional action on regulatory policy. It also includes the values of micro variables such as consumer demand for a new product that some firm f will introduce in period two as part of its fixed production plan. This last item is observable since at the end of period two consumers will have revealed their preferences towards the product, which in turn affect the firm's earnings.4 Therefore, given firm f's current production plan, investors nnow its returns will be conditional upon the observable component s. Unobservable states contain information about contingencies that would be observable if the appropriate experiments were done. Nevertheless the several firms' production plans are such that those experiments are not to be done. For example, the unobservable component contains information about consumer demand for different products that no firm is offering in period one or, given their fixed production plans, is planning to offer in period two. It also contains information about the feasibility and cost of those production techniologies that no firm is currently using or planning to use.
In the first period (now) consumers receive initial endowments of the single consumption good and shares of each firm's stock. Trade takes place in period one as each consumer, given the vector of market clearing prices, adjusts his initial endowment of consumption good and stockholdings to that portfolio of consumption anld stockholding that is maximal according to his preferences and budget constraint. where ui is i's state independent utility for consumption now and then and ii(st) is i's subjective probability of state (st) being realized.6 Assume that for any set of strictly positive prices P=I{P1,.., PF} the maximizing consumption bundle xi= {xi,..., x2(K)} has strictly positive components.
Let the only securities traded be the stocks of the F firms. A vector of prices P=(P,-..., PF), a vector of consumption plans x=(x1,..., x'), and a vector of stockholdings z=(z',..., zI) is a F-equilibrium for a given set of production plans if (a) for all i e .f, the plan (xi, zi) maximizes i's utility given the constraints (2), (3), (4), and (5) and (b) the market for each firm's stock clears, i.e., zi =1 for all feY. I defer for the moment defining equilibrium when the set of securities traded is not fixed to be the set S.
EQUILIBRIUM, IMPLICIT PRICES, AND SPANNING
Let ? be the LaGrangian expression formed from i's maximization problem (1). Given a set of prices p=(p1 a... PF), the first order conditions for i's stockholdings zi=(zli,.., zi) and consumption plan xi={xi, xi(11),..., xi(ST)}, which is constrained to satisfy the observability requirement (4), to be maximal are: 
THE INCENTIVE TO ACHIEVE SPANNING OF THE OBSERVABLE COMPONENT
This section shows that an economy is not in full equilibrium unless the set of observable components is spanned. Specifically if the observable component is not spanned, then entrepreneurs can make a riskless profit by introducing new securities. Therefore, if one is willing to assume that the economy does tend towards equilibrium, then spanning of the observable component is a consequence of the market process, not an assumption that may be arbitrarily made about the market structure.7
Permit any consumer i to issue a new security, labeled g, subject to the requirements that its returns (a) be nonnegative and (b) be a function only of the state space's observable component and not of its unobservable component.8 Thus, exactly as for each firm's stock, ag(s) _ ag(s1) = ag(s2) = = ag(sT) 2 0 for all s E .
Issuance of such a security is feasible because the observable component is observable and thus contracts can be made contingent on it. An Y-equilibrium is a full equilibrium only if no consumer can make a riskless profit by introducing a new security g onto the market. Thus if a F-equilibrium is a full equilibrium, then each consumer i has exhausted his opportunities for maximization with respect to his consumption plan xi, his trading plan zi, and the possibilities of introducing new securities. In a F-equilibrium each consumer takes the set of securities as given and maximizes only with respect to his plans xi and zi. The paper's first proposition is: in the absence of transaction costs, a necessary condition for a Y-equilibrium to be a full equilibrium is that the stocks of the F firms span the observable component. The only exception to this occurs when the market states are not spanned and, at some Y-equilibrium, all consumers by chance have the same implicit prices. This is an unlikely occurrence if consumers' utility functions, subjective probability assessments, and endowment streams are heterogeneous. Demonstration of the proposition is as follows. 
J O > 0
The first line is a first degree Taylor series approximation of the utility consequences of purchasing the unit of stock, which is accurate provided all components of ag are small. The second line follows from equations (7) and (8), the third and fourth lines follow from the definitions of Jit and s/, and the inequality follows from (13) because )J>O. Similarly, individual i wants to sell to individual e some quantity of g at price pg. If k astutely selects the prices p+ and p-, then the quantities that i wants to sell and j wants to buy will be equal and e can make a riskless profit of y(p -p-)> O where y is the positive quantity traded. Therefore, the economy is not in full equilibrium because e has an incentive to introduce a new security. This contradicts the original assumption that the market is in equilibrium and establishes the proposition.
After some entrepreneur has introduced security g, then a new #-equilibrium may be achieved with individuals trading the F stocks plus the new security g.9 I Since security g is purely a set of transfers from one individual to another and not a claim on the real returns of a firm, the market clearing condition for security g is Z_ z< =0, not , zg -1.
9
Exactly as before, a necessary condition for this new F-equilibrium to be a full equilibrium is that the F +1 securities being traded span the set of observable components. If they do not span the set of market states, then entrepreneurs have an incentive to introduce another security g'. Clearly, in a world of no transactions costs, this process continues until the variety of securities traded are sufficient to span the observable component of the state space.
SPANNING AND STOCKHOLDER UNANIMITY10
The preceding section showed that the market process does tend to insure that the observable component is spanned. This section derives two conditions under which a firm's stockholders will be unanimous towards an investment project that constitutes a change in the firm's production plan and, if adopted, will change the firm's vector of state contingent returns. The first of these conditions is well known and the second was recently developed by Leland [1978] . They are both derived here because in Section 6 they are given a specific interpretation that follows directly from the particular derivations that are presented here.
Throughout this section suppose that the state space's observable component is spanned. Take Leland [1978] in a significant and very interesting paper has developed a condition that is sufficient for stockholder unanimity for this case where the state space's observable component is spanned and the proposed project's returns' vector b varies with the unobservable events t. It is: if all consumers place identical conditional probabilities ti(tJs)=-t1i(st)/1E,i(st) on the possibility of the unobservable event t being realized given that the observable event s is realized, then unanimity is preserved. Moreover, Leland shows, it is not really necessary that all consumers agree on these conditional probabilities; rather all that is necessary is that they would all agree if they had the same, better information as the firm's management.
Leland's result may be derived as follows. Recall that by definition St= bi/Ai and i= ,4. Substitution from equations (8) Construction of a definition that (a) distinguishes between routine and innovative projects and (b) demonstrates that that definition is consistent with both the earlier section's formal results and this section's interpretation is most efficiently accomplished by discussing an example of both a routine project and an innovative project. Suppose, for the routine project example, firm f is considering increasing its manufacturing capacity by constructing a major plant addition. The paper's first formal result indicates that the observable component of the state space is certainly spanned for all practical purposes because, if it were not, financial entrepreneurs would introduce new securities until spanning were achieved. This, however, does not guarantee unanimity because the returns from construction of the addition necessarily depend on the state space's unobservable component.
Specifically, the cost of the addition depends on, among other factors, the stability of the soil on which the addition is to be built. If the soil is unexpectedly unstable, then the cost of constructing the foundations will jump by an order of magnitude and correspondingly decrease the project's returns. Clearly the soil conditions, unless the addition is actually built, is an aspect of the state space that is unobservable. Consequently, for the purposes of this example, the state space may be described as =0{ 1,..., S}, the observable component, and 6 ={ 1, 2}, the unobservable component where t = 1 deniotes stable soil and t =2 denotes unstable soil. Moreover the soil stability on which the addition will be built is a characteristic of nature; it does not change with other contingencies within the economy. Therefore every consumer will regard the state space's two components as statistically independent, i.e., t1i(st) =ti(s)ti (t) and q1(t J s)=t1'(t) for each ief.
Before firm f's manager makes his decision on whether to build the plant addition, he will secure an engineering report on the soil conditions at the proposed construction site. This report will allow him to assess quite objectively the risk that soil conditions will turn out to be unfavorable, i.e., based on the report he will revise his prior probability judgments itm(l) and i2(2) concerning soil conditions at the plant site. Moreover, because soil engineering is a well developed profession, his judgment will be objective in the sense that if all consumers read the engineering report and other information used by the manager in making his probability judgment, then they would agree very closely with his judgment. This means that Leland's condition for unanimity is met: the state space's observable component is spanned and all consumers would agree with the manager's probability assessment concerning the unobservable component if they had access to the better information on which he bases his judgment. Thus routine projects may be defined to be those projects for which generally accepted techniques exist for objectively assessing the probabilities of the relevant unobservable events.
Consider, as an example of an innovative project, firm f's decision concerning investment into a radical new technology for the smelting of iron ore. Suppose that this technology has been tested in a pilot plant, but never implemented on a commercial scale, an endeavor that involves scaling up the pilot by a factor of fifty. Moreover suppose that real technical controversy exists as to whether the process can be successfully scaled up by such a factor, i.e., equally qualified and informed engineers disagree substantially on what the probabilities of success are. 12 Exactly parallel to the first example, the state space's observable component may be expected to be spanned, the state space may be described by Y = {1,..., S} and T = {1, 2} where t= 1 denotes feasibility of the technology and t = 2 denotes infeasibility, and consumers probability judgments {ti(1), it(2)} concerning the unobservable component are independent of their probability judgments {,'(1), ?isi(S)} concerning the observable component. The difference with the first example is that even if all consumers had access to the same, better information that firm f's manager is using in making his decision concerning the proposed technology, then consumers would still seriously disagree among themselves on what the probabilities of success are. This is because no generally accepted technical methodology exists for evaluating the probabilities. Consequently 12 Currently such differences in opinion appear to be prevalent in regard to the commercial promise of fusion as an energy source. Harsanyi [1968, pp. 498-500] has argued that such differences in probability judgments generally stem from differences in information. I disagree because for the case of fusion it seems evident that two equally qualified engineers might fail to agree on the chances of success even if they were given unlimited time to exchange information. In other words, the source of such disagreements is, at least in part, differences in fundamental beliefs, not differences in information. The only way to get agreement in such cases is to do the experiment of trying to develop fusion as a commercial energy source and to observe the outcome.
Leland's conditions are not met and stockholder unanimity is not guaranteed. Thus innovative projects may be defined to be those projects for which generally accepted techniques do not exist for objectively assessing the probabilities of the relevant unobservable events.
In summary, this theoretical discussion suggests two conclusions regarding stockholder unanimity. First, stockholder unanimity is likely for investment decisions such as plant expansion that essentially involve more of the same. Second, decisions that involve substantial inniovation such as the implementation of a radical technology are likely to create division among stockholders. This latter conclusion places absolute limits on the extent that the market can mediate among stockholders' diverse risk preferences and subjective probabilities. Within a dynamic economy decisions of this latter, nonroutine type periodically face firms as new technologies are discovered and new products are conceived. Stockholders inevitably will disagree over which of these ideas are worth substantial investment. It is their very newness that makes it impossible for the market to have established a set of implicit prices by which managers can evaluate their appropriateness for investment.
SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The discussion above is incomplete in that it implicitly raises a number of important and interesting questions that I have not yet addressed. Three of these questions follow. First, and of obvious significance, the paper contains no discussion of welfare effects. In particular, what are the welfare implications of the conclusion that the security market is necessarily incomplete because securities can not be written that depend on the success or failure of innovations that no firm is trying. The work of Hart [1975] and Grossman [1977] on optimality within incomplete markets indicates that no simple answer is likely to exist to this question. Second, this paper has taken the division of the state space into observable and unobservable components as exogenous. This is clearly inappropriate, however, because the past choices of firms as to which innovations to adopt has determined this division. Therefore an important question is under what conditions a firm is likely to decide to go ahead with an innovative project for which stockholder unanimity does not exist. Third, and dependent on the answer to the second question, what do these limits on the scope of stockholder unanimity imply for public policy towards innovation.
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